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Abstract Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions are auctions that allow partici-
pants to bid for bundles of goods to buy, for bundles of goods to sell, and for trans-
formations of goods. The intuitive meaning of a bid for a transformation is that the
bidder is offering to produce a set of output goods after having received a set of input
goods. To solve such an auction the auctioneer has to choose a set of bids to accept
and decide on a sequence in which to implement the associated transformations. Mixed
auctions can potentially be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of
agents. However, mixed auctions can be effectively applied only if we can also ensure
their computational feasibility without jeopardising optimality. To this end, we propose
a graphical formalism, based on Petri nets, that facilitates the compact represention of
both the search space and the solutions associated with the winner determination prob-
lem for mixed auctions. This approach allows us to dramatically reduce the number
of decision variables required for solving a broad class of mixed auction winner de-
termination problems. An additional major benefit of our graphical formalism is that
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2it provides new ways to formally analyse the structural and behavioural properties of
mixed auctions.
1 Introduction
A combinatorial auction (CA) is an auction where bidders can buy (or sell) entire
bundles of goods in a single transaction [1]. Selling goods in bundles has the great
advantage of eliminating the risk for a bidder of not being able to obtain complementary
goods at a reasonable price in a follow-up auction. For example, think of a CA for a pair
of shoes, as opposed to two consecutive single-item auctions for each of the individual
shoes. The study of the mathematical, game-theoretic and algorithmic properties of
CAs has recently become a popular research topic in artificial intelligence and multi-
agent systems. This is due not only to their relevance to important application areas
such as electronic commerce or supply chain management, but also to the range of
deep research questions raised by this auction model.
In particular, supply chain formation (SCF) appears as a very promising applica-
tion area where strong complementarities arise. Indeed, Walsh et al. [2] observe that
production technologies often have to deal with strong complementarities: the inputs
and outputs of a production process are strongly connected since a producer may risk
to produce unsold goods, as well as fail to produce already sold goods when it is unable
to obtain the inputs, thus losing credibility on the market. Hence, a supply chain can
be regarded as an intricate network of producers (entities transforming input goods
into output goods at a certain cost), and consumers interacting in a complex way.
Nevertheless, the complementarities arising in SCF are different from the ones we do
find in CAs. The complementarities in SCF arise because of the preconditions and
post-conditions of production processes: precedences and dependencies along the sup-
ply chain must be taken into account. Hence, whilst in CAs the complementarities can
be simply represented as relationships among goods, in SCF the complementarities
involve not only goods, but also interrelated transformation (production) relationships
along several levels of the supply chain.
The first attempt to deal with the SCF problem by means of CAs was under-
taken by Walsh et al. in [3]. In order to automate SCF, they introduce the notion of
task dependency network as a way of capturing complementarities among production
processes (operations). Although very significant, this work does not allow bidders to
express their preferences over bundles of transformations; it does not define a bid-
ding language; and the structure of the supply chain has to fulfil strict criteria (e.g.
acyclicity, operations can only produce one output good, etc).
In order to overcome these drawbacks, we introduced in [4] the so-called mixed
multi-unit combinatorial auctions (henceforth mixed auction for short) and discussed
the issues of bidding and winner determination. Mixed auctions are a generalisation
of the standard model of CAs. Thus, rather than negotiating over goods, in mixed
auctions the auctioneer and the bidders can negotiate over supply chain operations
(henceforth operations for short), each one characterised by a set of input goods and
a set of output goods. A bidder offering an operation is willing to produce its output
goods after having received its input goods along with the payment specified in the
bid. While in standard CAs, a solution to the winner determination problem (WDP)
is a set of atomic bids to accept that maximises the auctioneer’s revenue, in mixed
auctions, the order in which the auctioneer “uses” the accepted operations matters.
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offers to make dough if provided with butter and eggs, and bidder Lou offers to bake
a cake if provided with enough dough, the auctioneer can accept both bids whenever
he uses Joe’s operation before Lou’s to obtain baked cakes from butter and eggs.
Just as the WDP for CAs, the WDP for mixed auctions can also be solved by
means of an Integer Linear Program (ILP), as shown in [4]. While this provides a first
algorithmic solution to the WDP, in the one proposed in [4] the number of variables
grows quadratically with the overall number of operations mentioned in the bids. Hence,
such an ILP limits the application of mixed auctions to small and medium scenarios, as
empirically shown in [5]. Hence, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to
SCF, we must ensure computational feasibility in practice while preserving optimality.
In this paper we make headway along this direction by extending our own work in [6].
We provide a graphical formalism that allows to compactly represent the search
space of the WDP for mixed auctions, leading to dramatic computational savings. In
order to obtain such a formalism we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we define a new type
of Petri Nets [7], the so-called Weighted Transition Petri Nets (henceforth weighted
nets for short), to express the notion of transformation (production) cost. Petri nets
are a well known graphical tool to analyse discrete dynamical systems. We resort to
Petri Nets because: (i) they can naturally help capture the notions of transformation;
(ii) they have a well-defined semantics that can naturally accommodate the notion of
sequence of transformations; (iii) they have an integrated description of both states and
actions to characterise the search space where transformations occur; (iv) they have a
large number of formal analysis methods that allow the investigation of their structural
and dynamic properties; and (v) they have a graphical representation that is intuitively
very appealing to study problems related to the topology of the supply chain. Secondly,
we introduce and solve a new type of reachability problem over weighted nets to which
we map the mixed auction WDP. Two major benefits, and therefore contributions,
stem from this process. First of all, as a main benefit, we do manage to provide a
formalism with which mixed auctions, and therefore all auction types subsumed by
mixed auctions, in particular CAs for SCF, can be formally analysed. For instance,
topological problems of a supply chain can be readily analysed by means of adapting
Petri Nets tools. As a second benefit, direct consequence of the provided mapping to
weighted nets, we manage to dramatically reduce the number of decision variables in
the optimisation problem posed by mixed auctions from quadratic to linear for a wide
class of WDPs. Hence, we make headway in the practical application of mixed auctions,
and in particular to SCF as intended.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide some background on CAs
and discuss some relevant issues in the related literature. Then, in Section 3 we delve
into bidding languages and the WDP for mixed auctions. In Section 4 we introduce
weighted nets and a new optimisation problem on them: the so-called Constrained
Maximum Weighted Occurrence Sequence Problem. Next, we explain how to solve
such optimisation problem by means of an ILP. In Section 5 we show how to map
a mixed auction WDP to a Constrained Maximum Weighted Occurrence Sequence
Problem, thereby managing to significantly reduce the WDP search space. Finally, in
Section 6 we draw some conclusions and illustrate some paths to future research.
42 Background and Related work
A combinatorial auction (CA) [1] is an auction where bidders can buy (or sell) entire
bundles of goods in a single transaction. A CA is single-unit when there is a single copy
of each item at auction (each item has multiplicity one). We say that a CA is multi-unit
when there are multiple copies of some item(s). Although CAs are computationally very
complex [8], the fact that bidders can express their preferences over bundles of goods
may help both bidders and auctioneer to obtain better deals. In fact, buying items in
bundles has the great advantage of eliminating the risk for a bidder of not being able
to sell complementary items at a reasonable price in a follow-up auction. Indeed, CAs
may lead to more efficient allocations whenever complementarities among the goods at
auction hold.
CAs can potentially be employed as an allocation mechanism in a wide variety
of real-world domains. Thus, they have been proposed to be employed for allocating
loads to trucks in the transportation market [9], routes to buses [10], goods/services to
buyers/providers in industrial procurement scenarios [11], airport arrival and depar-
ture slots [12], radio-frequency spectrum for wireless communications services [13], and
supply chain formation [2].
Auction theory studies the formal properties of auctions [14,15]. CAs have recently
attracted the attention of economists and game theorists. Associated to auction theory
is also the design of auction mechanisms, devoted to study how to run an auction in
order to guarantee some economic properties such as, for instance, efficiency, incentive
compatibility, individual rationality, etc. Regarding mechanism design issues of CAs,
the reader can refer to [1].
Bidding is the process of transmitting —truthfully or otherwise— one’s valuation
function over the sets of goods on auction to the auctioneer. A bidding language is
a formal language for representing valuations. Ideally, it should allow for a compact
representation of the information to be transmitted, and it should allow the auctioneer
to reason about this information efficiently. The most widely used bidding language
is the so-called OR-language. In this setting, each bidder can submit any number of
atomic bids (bundles of goods labelled with a price), and the auctioneer may accept
any set of atomic bids, provided the associated bundles do not overlap, and charge each
bidder the sum of prices of their accepted bids. In the XOR-language, on the other
hand, the auctioneer may accept at most one atomic bid from each bidder. Different
langauges can differ in expressive power, compactness of representation, and complexity
of the associated reasoning problems. Nisan [16] surveys the formal properties of this
family of bidding languages in detail. In [4] we have shown how to adapt these languages
to mixed auctions, and in the next section we will recall the definition of the XOR-
language in detail.
The winner determination problem (WDP) is the problem of choosing which goods
to award to which bidder so as to maximise the auctioneer’s revenue. WDP for CAs is
a complex computational problem. In fact, one of the fundamental issues limiting the
applicability of CAs to real-world scenarios is the computational complexity associated
to the WDP. In particular, it has been proved that the WDP for CAs is NP-complete
[17]. General ILP solvers [18] and special purpose algorithms (e.g. [19], [20], and [21])
have been employed to solve WDP. For an extended review on WDP and related issues
the reader can refer to [22], [23], and [24].
According to Walsh et al. [3], “Supply Chain Formation (SCF) is the process of
determining the participants in a supply chain, who will exchange what with whom,
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with complementarities among the goods at trade. Since production technologies often
have to deal with strong complementarities, the automation of SCF appears as a very
promising application area for CAs. However, whilst in CAs the complementarities can
be simply represented as relationships among goods, in SCF the complementarities
involve not only goods, but also operations (production relationships) along several
levels of the supply chain. The first attempt to deal with the SCF problem by means of
CAs was undertaken by Walsh et al. in [3]. In order to automate SCF, they introduce
the notion of task dependency network as a way of capturing complementarities among
production processes. Although very significant, this work does not allow bidders to
express their preferences over bundles of production processes; it does not define a
bidding language; and the structure of the supply chain has to fulfil strict criteria (e.g.
acyclicity, processes can only produce one output good, etc). Thus, we observe that
further requirements (namely expressiveness, computability, and formal analysis) must
be addressed to fully support automated SCF. As to expressiveness requirements, we
need: to represent complementarities among production processes (e.g. if iron and cop-
per are melt together in the same oven, the transformation can be offered at a lower
cost than the service of transforming iron and copper separately); to represent produc-
tion relationships with multiple output goods (e.g. the quartering of a cow to sell its
parts); to offer some bidding language to express combinations of bids; to consider the
notion of free disposal (buy goods or transformations that remain unused); to support
the specification of the configuration to end up with (a supply chain manager may be
interested in finishing the SCF process with a given surplus of goods); to support a wide
range of supply chain topologies beyond acyclic nets. As to computational requirements,
we must ensure computational feasibility of SCF while preserving optimality. Finally,
as to formal requirements, we advocate for counting on a formalism that supports the
formal study of structural and behavioural properties of a supply chain. We argue that
our contributions in [4] along with the contributions detailed in this paper allow us to
satisfactorily address the requirements above, and therefore address the automation of
supply chains of agents.
3 Mixed Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions
In order to successfully tackle the automation of SCF, we introduced in [4] mixed
multi-unit combinatorial auctions (mixed auctions), a generalization of the standard
model of CAs. Rather than negotiating over goods, in mixed auctions the auctioneer
and the bidders can negotiate over supply chain operations, each one characterized by
a set of input goods and a set of output goods.
In this section we review previous work on bidding and winner determination for
mixed auctions. In particular, we describe the features of the proposed bidding lan-
guage, designed to allow bidders to express several types of complex bids; and we
summarize the features of a general ILP solver that solves the WDP by finding the
optimal sequence of supply chain operations. The material contained in this section is
described in [4], and more extensively in [25].
63.1 Bidding Language
Since we deal with supply chain formation, in our case the bidding language must
be able to refer to operations across the supply chain. In order to cope with this
requirement, we distinguish three kinds of supply chain operations:(i) the supply of a
manufacturing operation; (ii) the supply of a bundle of goods; and (iii) the request of
a bundle of goods. In what follows we use operation as an abbreviation of supply chain
operation.
Definition 1 Let G be the finite set of all the types of goods under consideration. An
operation is a pair (I,O) of multisets over G. ⊓⊔
We recall that given a set G, a multiset over G is a function from G to N. It can
be seen as a subset of G where the number of appearances of each element is counted.
Whenever G is a finite set, finite multisets over G can be identified with non-negative
integer vectors of dimension |G|. Let a, b ∈ G, by 3′a + 5′b we represent a multiset
containing three copies of a and five copies of b. If X = 6′a + 2′b, then X (a) = 6 and
X (b) = 2 and X (g) = 0 for all g such that b 6= g 6= a. In general, given k ∈ N ∪ {0}
and g ∈ G, we write the multiset containing k copies of g as k′g. Also, given X and Y
multisets over G, X + Y is their union, defined as (X + Y)(g) = X (g) + Y(g) for each
good g ∈ G.
An agent offering operation (I,O) declares that it can deliver O after having
received I. For instance, ({ }, 1′a) means that the agent in question is able to deliver a
(no input required), and (1′b, 1′c) means that it is able to deliver c if provided with b.
Our goal is to have agents negotiate over bundles of operations. That is, in our
setting bidders can offer any number of such operations, including several copies of
the same operation. Then, we have to introduce a formalism that allows an agent to
express preferences over bundles of operations. That is, agents will be negotiating over
multisets of operations. Notice that such a formalism will allow the bidder to express:
– offers for bundles of goods, expressed as operations with no inputs. That means
that nothing is taken as input (I = { }), and O is provided as output.
– requests of bundles of goods, expressed as operations with no output. That means
that I is taken as input, and nothing (O = { }) is provided as output.
– offers for bundles of operations, expressed as:
{α′1(I1,O1) + α
′
2(I2,O2) + . . . + α
′
m(Im,Om)}
where αi ∈ N is the multiplicity of operation (Ii,Oi).
A bidder can express such preferences by a valuation function. In what follows we
provide a definition of valuation.
Definition 2 A valuation v is a (typically partial) function from multisets of opera-
tions to the real numbers. ⊓⊔
Intuitively, given a multiset of operations D, v(D) = p means that the agent
equipped with valuation v is willing to make a payment of p in return for being al-
located all the operations in D (in case p is a negative number, this means that the
agent will accept the deal if it receives an amount of |p|). For instance, v(1′(1′oven +
1′dough, 1′oven + 1′cake)) = −20 means that a bidder can produce a cake for 20 if
given an oven and some dough, and that she will return the oven again afterwards.
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tions to the auctioneer and to do that they need to use a bidding language. A suitable
bidding language should allow a bidder to encode choices between alternative bids and
the like [16]. Informally, an OR-combination of several bids means that the bidder
would be happy to accept any number of the sub-bids specified, if paid the sum of the
associated prices. An XOR-combination of bids expresses that the bidder is prepared
to accept at most one of them. For the formal definition of the WDP below, we restrict
ourselves to bids in the XOR-language, which is known to befully expressive for mixed
auctions [4]. In the XOR-language each bidder submits a single bid that is an XOR
combination of a set of atomic bids. In order to properly define the XOR-language we
need to introduce the concept of atomic bid and what it means to XOR-combine a set
of atomic bids.
An atomic bid is the smallest piece of information a bidder can submit. It is com-
posed of a finite multiset of operations and a price. An atomic bid Bid = bid(D, p)
communicates to the auctioneer that the bidder is willing to pay p for being allocated
all the operations in D (or some other operation requiring him to produce at most
the same output goods from at least the same input). Hence, it defines the following
valuation:
v(D′) =

p if D provides equal or better operations than D′
−∞ otherwise
where we say that D provides equal or better operations than D′ if we can establish
a one to one mapping f from D to D′ and for every operation op ∈ D, we have that
f(op) ∈ D′ takes at least the same inputs and provides at most the same outputs1.
Let Bid = Bid1 xor · · · xor Bidn be an XOR-combination of n atomic bids Bid i,
with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. When a bidder submits it, it is communicating to the auctioneer
the following valuation:
v(D) = max{vi(D) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
That is, the XOR-combination offers the auctioneer the possibility to select the atomic
bid maximizing its revenue.
3.2 Winner Determination Problem. Informal Definition
The input to the WDP consists of a complex bid expression for each bidder, a multiset
Uin of goods the auctioneer holds to begin with, and a multiset Uout of goods the
auctioneer expects to end up with.
In standard CAs, a solution to the WDP is a set of atomic bids to accept. In our
setting, however, the order in which the auctioneer “uses” the accepted operations mat-
ters. For instance, if the auctioneer holds a to begin with, then checking whether ac-
cepting the two bids Bid1 = bid(1
′(1′a, 1′b), 10) and Bid2 = bid(1
′(1′b, 1′c), 20) is
feasible involves realising that we have to use Bid1 before Bid2. Thus, a solution for
WDP will be a sequence of operations. A valid solution has to meet two conditions:
1. Bidder constraints. The multiset of operations in the sequence has to respect the
bids submitted by the bidders, namely:
1 This “free disposal” condition is treated more formally in [4]. For our main purposes in
this paper, the improvement of winner determination algorithms, this is not a relevant detail.
8(a) If a bidder submits an offer over a bundle of operations, all of them must be
employed in the operation sequence.
(b) If a bidder submits an XOR-combination of atomic bids, at most one of them
may be accepted.
2. Auctioneer constraints. The sequence of operations has to be implementable, namely:
(a) the set of goods held by the auctioneer prior each operation must be a superset
of the inputs of the operation; and
(b) the set of goods held by the auctioneer at the end of the sequence must be a
superset of Uout.
An optimal solution is a valid solution that maximises the sum of prices associated
with the atomic bids selected.
3.3 Solving the WDP by Integer Linear Programming
We now show how to map the WDP defined in Section 3.2 into a more formal definition,
by encoding it in ILP. Here and in what follows:
– let n be the total number of bidders;
– i acts as a bidder index and when quantified it ranges over all bidders;
– for each bidder i, we use j as an atomic bid index ranging from 1 to mi, the number
of atomic bids submitted by bidder i;
– Bidij = bid(Dij , pij) is the j-th atomic bid within the XOR-bid submitted by
bidder i, Dij being a multiset of operations and pij the price of the bid;
– B = {Bidij : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ mi} is the set that contains all the atomic bids;
– for each atomic bid j of bidder i, k acts as an operation index and when quantified
ranges from 1 to the number of operations in that atomic bid;
– tijk is the k-th operation appearing in the j-th atomic bid of bidder i;
– Iijk and Oijk are respectively the input and output multisets of operation tijk;
– Dij(tijk) is the multiplicity of tijk in Dij ;
– D =
U
ij Dij stands for the multiset of the overall operations received with their
multiplicity;2
– T = {tijk : ∀ijk} is the set of the overall operations in the bids disregarding their
multiplicity;
– δ is the overall number of operations mentioned anywhere in the bids (taking ac-
count of their multiplicity); i.e. δ =
P
ij |Dij | =
P
ijk Dij(tijk), and therefore it
also stands for the maximum length of the solution sequence (provided all opera-
tions are used);
– G is the set types of negotiated goods;
– g ranges over all goods; and
– m always ranges from 1 to δ.
First, as in standard combinatorial auctions, we need to encode which bids are selected.
Thus, we define a set of binary decision variables xij ∈ {0, 1}, where xij takes on value
1 iff the j-th atomic bid of bidder i is selected. Furthermore, for each operation in a
selected bid we need to choose its position in the solution sequence. Thus, we define
a set of binary decision variables xmijk ∈ {0, 1}, where x
m
ijk takes on value 1 if the
operation tijk is selected at the m-th position of the solution sequence, and 0 otherwise.
2 The operator
U
performs the sum (as described after Definition 1) of several multisets.
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fulfil:
1. For simplicity, we impose that at most one operation is selected at each position of
the sequence: X
ijk
x
m
ijk ≤ 1 (∀m) (1)
2. We enforce the constraints expressed by condition (1.a) in Section 3.2. Thus, if
bid Bidij is selected, all the operations tijk in that bid must be selected exactly
Dij(tijk) times. In other words, if bid Bidij is selected, all the operations in it must
be selected with the required multiplicity. Formally,
xij · Dij(tijk) =
X
m
x
m
ijk (∀ijk) (2)
3. We enforce that the atomic bids submitted by each bidder are exclusive (XOR).
This amounts to satisfying the following constraints (cf. condition (1.b) in Section
3.2): X
j
xij ≤ 1 (∀i) (3)
Observe that in the case of the OR bidding language we simply have to remove
this constraint.
4. Next, we capture condition (2.a) in Section 3.2 requiring that enough goods are
available at step m to perform the next operation, namely:
Uin(g) +
m−1X
l=0
X
ijk
x
l
ijk · [Oijk(g)− Iijk(g)] ≥
X
ijk
x
m
ijk · Iijk(g) (∀g, ∀m) (4)
5. And finally, after having performed all the selected operations, the set of goods
held by the auctioneer must be a superset of the final goods Uout (cf. condition
(2.b) in Section 3.2):
Uin(g) +
δX
m=0
X
ijk
x
m
ijk · [Oijk(g)− Iijk(g)] ≥ Uout(g) (∀g) (5)
Now solving the WDP for MMUCAs with XOR-bids amounts to solving the fol-
lowing binary linear program, which we name Direct Integer Program (DIP):
max
X
ij
xij · pij subject to constraints (2)– (5) (6)
Now it is time to assess the number of decision variables used by DIP.
Proposition 1 The number of decision variables used by DIP is quadratic in the num-
ber of operations involved in the auction.
Proof DIP has δ · |T |+ |B| binary decision variables:
– δ · |T | variables (xmijk), where δ is the maximum length of the solution sequence and
|T | is the size of the set of different operations.
– |B| variables (xij), where |B| is the number of atomic bids submitted by the bidders.
Hence, the number of decision variables is O(δ · |T |). ⊓⊔
Observe that our proposed implementation can easily be amended so as to directly
encode the constraints imposed by language constructs other than the XOR-operator.
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Fig. 1 Example of a Place Transition Net.
4 Extending Place Transition Nets
Our endeavour hereafter will focus on reducing the number of decision variables re-
quired by an ILP to solve a mixed auction WDP. Along this path we start in this
section by introducing a new optimisation problem on an extension of Place Transi-
tion Nets. In Section 5 we show how instances of the WDP for mixed auctions can be
transformed into instances of the optimisation problem described in this section. As
a result of such transformation we manage to reduce the number of decision variables
from quadratic to linear in the number of operations.
In this section, we first introduce Place Transition Nets to subsequently extend
them to incorporate a value function. We call the resulting model Weighted Place
Transition Nets. Afterwards, we define a new optimization problem on Weighted Place
Transition Nets, the Constrained Maximum Weighted Occurrence Sequence Problem.
Finally, we explain how to solve such an optimization problem (in some special cases)
by means of Integer Linear Programming.
4.1 Petri Nets and Place Transition Nets
Petri Nets are a powerful mathematical and graphical tool for the description of discrete
distributed systems. They were first introduced in 1962 by Karl Adam Petri in his
seminal dissertation [26]. In particular they are suitable for describing systems in which
parallelism, concurrency, and synchronization play an important role. We refer the
reader to [7] for a very good review.
We will focus on a particular type of Petri net called Place Transition Net. In the
following we refer to Place Transition Net as net for short. Formally, following [7]:
Definition 3 (Place Transition Net Structure) A Place Transition Net Structure
is a tuple N = (P, T, A, E) where P is a set of places, T is a finite set of transitions
such that P ∩T = ∅, A ⊆ (P ×T )∪ (T ×P ) is a set of arcs, and E : A → N+ is an arc
expression function (E(t, p) stands for the number of tokens introduced by transition
t into place p and E(p, t) stands for the number of tokens substracted from place p by
transition t). ⊓⊔
In the following, we use the term structure to refer to a Place Transition Net
Structure for short.
A distribution of tokens over the set of places is called a marking, and it stands for
the state of the net.
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Definition 4 (Marking) A marking M : P → N of a structure is a multiset over P .
M(p) = k means that place p ∈ P contains k tokens for marking M. ⊓⊔
A net is a structure S together with a given initial marking M0. An example of net is
shown in Figure 1. The graphical representation of a net is composed of the following
graphical elements: places (drawn as circles), transitions (drawn as rectangles), arcs
(connecting places to transitions or transitions to places) labelled with values of an arc
expression function E. Tokens are drawn as bullet points inside the circles representing
places.
Given a markingM, we say that a transition is enabled if all its input places contain
at least as many tokens as required by the the transition’s input arcs. Intuitively, a
transition is enabled if enough tokens are present in its input places. In other words, a
transition t ∈ T is said to be enabled if each input place p of t is marked with at least
E(p, t) tokens, where E(p, t) represents the weight of the arc connecting p to t. More
formally,
Definition 5 (Enabled Transition) Given a marking M, a transition t ∈ T is
enabled iff M(p) ≥ E(p, t) ∀(p, t) ∈ A. ⊓⊔
If a transition is enabled it can fire consuming the tokens specified by E of the
input places and producing the tokens specified by E in the output places. An enabled
transition may or may not fire. If it fires, it changes the current marking to a new
marking by removing tokens from the input places and putting tokens into the output
places. More formally:
Definition 6 (Firing of an enabled transition) The firing of an enabled transition
t removes E(pi, t) tokens from each input place pi and adds E(t, po) tokens to each
output place po. The firing of a transition t changes marking Mk−1 to a marking Mk.
The new marking can be computed employing the following equation:
Mk(p) = Mk−1(p) + E(t, p)− E(p, t) ∀p ∈ P (7)
Note that in this equation and henceforth, for simplicity, we assume that E(p, t) = 0
if (p, t) 6∈ A and E(t, p) = 0 if (t, p) 6∈ A. ⊓⊔
4.1.1 Reachability
Recall that any WDP for a mixed auction defines an initial multiset of goods Uin and
a final multiset of goods Uout. Hence, we can think of the problem as reaching Uout
starting from Uin. There is a similar problem in nets: the problem of reachability. It
studies whether we can reach a particular state of a net departing from a given initial
state only by using a sequence of net transitions.
Definition 7 (Firing Sequence) Given a structure S and a marking M0, a firing
sequence is a sequence of transitions 〈t1, t2, . . . , td〉 from S such that t1 is enabled in
M0 and for all i ∈ [2, d], ti is enabled after firing ti−1. ⊓⊔
By the repeated application of equation (7) a firing sequence J = 〈t1, t2, . . . , td〉
brings marking M0 to Md:
Md(p) = M0(p) +
X
t∈J
[E(t, p)− E(p, t)] ∀p ∈ P (8)
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Definition 8 (Reachability) A marking Md is reachable from a marking M0 in a
structure S if there exists a firing sequence that transforms M0 into Md. ⊓⊔
All the markings reachable from M0 in a structure S are written R(S,M0), and
are called the reachable set of a net.
4.1.2 Reachability and the state equation
In the general case Lipton [27] proved that the reachability problem is EXPSPACE-
hard. And yet, it is reasonable to wonder whether there are special classes of nets on
which reachability is computationally simpler. In this section we show that indeed
computation is simpler for a particular topology of nets by relying on results proved
in [7].
Given a net with r transitions and n places, its incidence matrix A = [aij ] is an
r × n matrix of integers. Each entry is given by aij = E(ti, pj)− E(pj , ti). Hence, aij
is the difference in the number of tokens in place j when transition i fires once.
We can represent a marking Mk as an n× 1 column vector Mk such that the j-th
entry of Mk represents the number of tokens present in place pj . We can identify each
transition ti with a firing vector u
ti , an r × 1 column vector having a 1 at position i
and zeros elsewhere. We can now express equation (7) in matrix form as:
Mk = Mk−1 + A
T
u
t (9)
where AT stands for the transpose of incidence matrix A.
Given a firing sequence J = 〈t1, . . . , td〉, its firing count vector KJ is an r×1 column
vector containing at the i-th position the number of times that the i-th transition in
T is repeated in sequence J . Formally, KJ =
Pd
k=1 u
tk .
Say that Md is reachable from M0, then there exists a firing sequence J =
〈t1, t2, ..., td〉 bringing from marking M0 to Md. Therefore, a necessary condition on
reachability can be expressed in terms of a matrix equation:
Theorem 1 (Murata,1989) If Md is reachable from M0, then the following equa-
tion has a non-negative integer solution x:
Md = M0 + A
T x (10)
The proof consists in showing that x = KJ is a solution. Notice that the i-th entry
of vector x encodes the number of times a transition ti must be fired to transform M0
into Md.
Equation (10) is called the state equation, since it describes the states that a
net would reach if the transitions encoded in x were fired. However, notice that the
condition is not sufficient because the existence of a solution does not always imply
that Md is reachable from M0. However, we can show that sometimes all the states
reachable by a net are described by the state equation. In particular, this happens
when the net is acyclic.
Definition 9 (Acyclicity) A directed cycle in a structure (P, T, A, E) is a sequence
of places and transitions 〈p1, t1, p2, t2, . . . , tn−1, pn〉 such that p1 = pn and for all
i ∈ [1, n] we have that (pi, ti) ∈ A and (ti, pi+1) ∈ A.
A structure is said to be acyclic if it does not contain any directed cycle. ⊓⊔
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In [7], it is shown that in an acyclic net, the condition expressed by Theorem 1 is
not only necessary, but also sufficient to guarantee reachability.
Theorem 2 (Murata,1989) In an acyclic structure (P, T, A, E), Md is reachable
from M0 iff the following equation has a non-negative integer solution in x:
Md = M0 + A
T x (11)
That is, for any acyclic net, if there exists a solution to equation (11), a firing
sequence reaching Md from M0 is guaranteed to exist, and x represents its firing
count vector.
Moreover, Murata further extends the class of nets for which the condition is still
sufficient. These particular nets (trap-circuit and syphon-circuit nets) have special
topologies with particular types of circuits. For such nets, the state equation represents
all the reachable states if the initial marking M0 satisfies some constraints. Further
efforts have been made for extending the validity of the state equation to more classes
of nets [28].
4.2 Weighted Place Transition Nets
There is a feature of some discrete systems (in particular the ones we consider) that, to
the best of our knowledge, has never been considered so far in the Petri net literature,
and that we deem as fundamental. A change in the state of a system may have an
associated value. For instance, in our case, an operation has an associated value every
time it is performed. Thus, in order to model operations, we need to extend nets to
incorporate the notion of transition value. Such extension will allow us not only to
represent the fact that a value is associated with each transition firing, but also to
easily compute the value of a firing sequence.
We extend the notion of net (see Section 4.1) by attaching a value to each transition.
This leads us to the definition of Weighted Place Transition Net Structure and Weighted
Place Transition Net (henceforth referre to as weighted structure and weighted net
respectively for short).
Definition 10 (Weighted Structure) A weighted structure is a a tuple (P, T, A, E, V )
where:
– (P, T, A, E) is a structure.
– V : T → R is a function that assigns a value to each transition.
⊓⊔
We define a weighted net by associating to a weighted structure an initial marking
M0.
The initial marking in a net represents the initial state of the system, the very same
semantics is inherited by weighted nets.
Weighted structures and weighted nets preserve all the properties of structures and
nets respectively, but allow the quantitative representation of the value of a transition.
Therefore, we can naturally apply to them all the concepts employed for nets. Those
include the concepts of enabling of a transition, firing of a transition, marking, firing
sequence, and so on.
A weighted net processes a firing sequence (Section 4.1.1)as follows: firstly, the
weighted net evolves through a sequence of markings (states); and secondly, a value is
assessed for the firing sequence according to the following definition:
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Definition 11 (Value of a firing sequence) The value V of a firing sequence J =
〈t1, t2, ..., td〉 is the sum of the values of each transition contained in the sequence:
V (J) =
dX
i=1
V (ti) (12)
⊓⊔
If a transition fires more than once, say k times, then its value will be added k
times.
4.2.1 Constrained Maximum Weight Occurrence Sequence Problem
Since each transition has a value, it is reasonable to wonder about the optimal firing
sequence leading from an initial marking to some final marking. Moreover, and more
generally, we may require to compute the optimal firing sequence leading from an initial
marking M0 to a final marking Md that fulfils some constraints. For instance, a given
problem may require that each place in the final marking contains at least one token
(Md(p) > 1, ∀p ∈ P ). In order to model this more general optimisation problem, we
define the Constrained Maximum Weight Occurrence Sequence Problem (MAXSEQ).
Definition 12 (MAXSEQ) Given
– a weighted net N = (P, T, A, E,M0, V ),
– a set of inequality constraints over a subset (P≥) of the places of a marking Md,
expressed as:
∀p ∈ P≥ Md(p) ≥ gp, (13)
– and a set of equality constraints over a subset (P=) of the places of a marking Md,
expressed as:
∀p ∈ P= Md(p) = hp (14)
find a firing sequence Jopt = 〈t1, t2, ..., td〉 that maximizes the sequence value V among
the ones that bring from some initial marking M0 to a final marking Md that fulfills
the constraints in equations (13) and (14). ⊓⊔
4.2.2 Reducing MAXSEQ to ILP
An ILP takes the form: maximize f(x) subject to g(x) ≥ g and h(x) = h where f ,g and
h are linear functions, g and h are real vectors and x is a vector of integer variables.
Our aim now is to encode MAXSEQ as an ILP. Since the structure is very similar, we
only need to identify what ILP variables we will use and then show that the function
to maximize and the constraints in MAXSEQ are a linear function of these variables.
As state space we will use a vector x of r integer variables, r being the number
of transitions in the network. Each variable represents the number of times a transi-
tion has fired. In Section 4.1.2, we showed that under some hypothesis on a net, it
is possible to express its overall reachability set by means of an equation, the state
equation. Concretely, Theorem 2 establishes that given an M0 and a acyclic net with
incidence matrix A, the set {M0 + A
T x ≥ 0 | x is a vector of non-negative integers}
contains exactly the markings reachable from M0. This result allows us to represent
the MAXSEQ search space by a means of the vector of integers x. Furthermore, this
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result also shows that the final marking Md in term of which the constraints are ex-
pressed, is a linear function of x (since Md = M0 +A
T x). This result can be extended
to weighted nets without changes and is the basis for our ILP program.
Notice also that the function to maximize, (that is, the value of each firing sequence)
does not depend on the order of the sequence (see equation (12)). Furthermore, since
a value is associated to each transition in the net, the value depends linearly on the
number of times each transition fires. We define a vector v ∈ R|T | whose j-th position
represents the value associated with transition tj (v[j] = V (tj)). Hence, the value
associated with the firing sequence represented by x, is:
V (x) = vT x (15)
Now that we have shown the connection between MAXSEQ and ILP, we can for-
mally state it.
Theorem 3 Given a MAXSEQ instance formed by a weighted net (P, T, A, E,M0, V )
with incidence matrix A and the constraints appearing in equations (13) and (14):
If the state equation describes all the reachable states of the weighted net, then all
the non-negative integer solutions x of the following ILP:
max vT x (16)
subject to ∀p ∈ P≥ Md(p) ≥ gp (17)
∀p ∈ P= Md(p) = hp (18)
where Md = M0 + A
T x (19)
represent the firing count vectors of all the optimal solutions to the MAXSEQ instance.
Proof Notice that equation (19) computes the final marking as a linear function of x.
Since the state equation describes all the reachable states, Md will range over every
possible final marking. Then equations (17) and (18) directly translate the constraints
in equations (13) and (14) in MAXSEQ. Finally, equation (16) computes the value of
the firing sequence as given by (15). As a result, a solution x∗ to the ILP defined by
equations (16)-(19) optimizes the sum of the values associated with fired transitions
while ensuring that the final marking is reachable and fulfils the constraints defined by
the MAXSEQ instance. ⊓⊔
Note that the number of integer variables required to solve MAXSEQ via ILP is
exactly |T |, that is, the number of transitions of the net.
According to the results stated in Theorem 2, it is possible to express the reacha-
bility set with the state equation when the net is acyclic. Then, we apply this result to
MAXSEQ via the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Provided that a net is acyclic, every MAXSEQ defined on it can be re-
duced to ILP.
Proof Since the net is acyclic, in virtue of Theorem 2, all the reachable states M are
the non-negative integer solutions of equation (11). Given a MAXSEQ instance over
that net, by Theorem 3 the firing count vectors of all the solutions are represented by
the solutions to the ILP in equations (16)-(19).
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Hence, every MAXSEQ instance over the net can be solved in two steps. First, we
determine the optimal firing count vector xopt by solving the ILP in equations (16)-
(19). Then, since the net is acyclic, we can establish a partial order among transitions
so that t1 ≺ t2 iff t2 uses as input some output of t1. We can construct an occurrence
sequence Jopt by ordering the transitions in x
opt non-decreasingly according to our
partial ordering. In that way, every step in Jopt is guaranteed to be enabled and con-
sequently Jopt is a solution to the MAXSEQ instance. ⊓⊔
5 Mapping mixed auctions to weighted nets
In this section we demonstrate that an instance of the mixed auction WDP can be
transformed into an instance of the MAXSEQ problem introduced in Section 4.2.1.
Notice that this mapping allows us to benefit from analysis methods to study behavioral
properties of Petri nets. Hence, we exploit such analysis methods to provide an ILP
formulation for some classes of weighted nets, and therefore some types of supply chain
networks.
5.1 Intuitions behind the mapping
The idea behind the mapping is that an atomic operation can be regarded as a tran-
sition in a weighted net. Consider the following offer, expressed by a bidder in the
bidding language introduced in Section 3.1:
Bid1 = bid(1
′(2′H2O, 1
′
O2 + 2
′
H2),−8) (20)
This represents an offer to perform an hydrolysis process: 2 moles of water are
transformed into 1 mole of oxygen and two moles of hydrogen at a price of e 8. Now
consider the transition depicted in Figure 2, and say that each place represents a good.
Let the place labelled with H2O be water, H2 be hydrogen, and O2 be oxygen. The
transition in Figure 2 perfectly captures the semantics of a supply chain operation: the
input places of the transitions are the input goods of the operation, its output places
are the output goods of the operation, and the transition value is the value associ-
ated with the operation. Analogously, an operation offering goods can be represented
as a transition with only output places, whereas an operation requesting goods as a
transition with only input places.
Example 1 Say that the following bids are submitted to a mixed auction:
bid1 = bid(1
′({ }, 2′H2O),−10) (21)
bid2 = bid(1
′({ }, 2′H2O),−14) (22)
bid3 = bid(1
′(2′H2O, 1
′
O2 + 2
′
H2),−8) (23)
bid4 = bid(1
′(2′H2 + 1
′
O2, { }), 23) (24)
bid5 = bid(1
′(2′H2 + 1
′
O2, { }), 25) (25)
We can represent them graphically by the weighted net in Figure 3. ⊓⊔
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Fig. 2 Example of an operation represented as a transition in a weighted net.
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Fig. 3 Example of bids in a mixed auction represented as a weighted net.
Finding the revenue-maximizing solution in example 1 is straightforward. Firstly,
buy two moles of water from bid1, then process the water through the operation in bid3,
and then sell the products of the reaction to bid5. The total revenue of the supply chain
is 25 − 8 − 10 =e 7. Notice that this is also the solution to the MAXSEQ problem3
defined on the weighted net in Figure 3 with an empty initial marking and with a
destination marking Md satisfying the following constraints:
Md(H2O) ≥ 0 (26)
Md(O2) ≥ 0 (27)
Md(H2) ≥ 0 (28)
Given the example above, we argue that if we construct a MAXSEQ instance by:
1. building a weighted net joining all the atomic operations received within bids;
3 So far under the hypothesis that transitions can fire at most once. We will solve the issue
of limiting the number of times each transition can fire further on.
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2. setting the initial marking to the goods initially available to the auctioneer (Uin);
and
3. setting some constraints on the final marking (Uout),
then the solution to the MAXSEQ instance corresponds to the solution to the mixed
auction WDP.
Nonetheless, we must take some more details into account. Firstly, in the previous
example, given the weighted net representation, each operation can be used an arbi-
trary number of times. Instead, the semantics of the bidding language imposes that
operations must be used a limited number of times. Secondly, we must provide bidders
with the capability of encoding on the weighted net both offers or requests over bundles
of operations. Moreover, they also require the capability of encoding on the weighted
net sets of mutually exclusive (XOR) atomic bids. Addressing these three issues is the
purpose of the following section.
5.2 Representing Bids
In Example 1, we restricted ourselves to the case in which agents can only submit one
atomic bid. Moreover, we only consider bidding over a single atomic operation, i.e.
|Dij | = 1. Next, we progressively relax all these constraints. First of all, we explain
how to represent a weighted net a bid on a bundle (multiset) of operations.
5.2.1 Expressing bids on bundles of operations
Given an atomic bid Bidij , combinatorial on operations, we have to ensure that:
– if an atomic operation tijk in bid Bidij is included in the solution sequence,
– it must be included in the solution as many times as required by the multiplicity
of tijk in the bid (Dij(tijk));
– all the other atomic operations tijk′ within the same atomic bid (all the opera-
tions in Dij) must be included as many times as required by their multiplicities
(Dij(tijk′)) as well;
– the money that the bidder must pay (receive) is the price of the whole bid (pij).
Recall that bidder constraint 1.a) in Section 3.2 imposed that if a bidder submits
an offer over a bundle of operations, all of them must be employed in the operation
sequence. This is precisely what the first condition above captures.
We achieve this by introducing some auxiliary places and transitions. The example
in Figure 4 represents the following bid:
Bidij = bid(1
′
tij1 + 3
′
tij2 + 2
′
tij3,−20)
where tij1 = (2
′p1, 1
′p2 +2
′p3), tij2 = (1
′p4, 1
′p6 +1
′p7) and tij3 = (1
′p5, 1
′p8 +1
′p9).
In general, in order to incorporate a bid over multiple operations we proceed as
follows:
– for each bid Bidij we introduce an auxiliary transition tij (bid transition) and an
auxiliary place cij (bid place).
– for each atomic operation tijk within bid Bidij , we add an auxiliary place cijk
(cij1, cij2, and cij3 in Figure 4), called operation place.
19
tij3tij2
p2 p3
p1 p4 p5
p6 p7 p8 p9
tij1
2
1
2
1 1
1
1
1
1
cij1 cij2 cij3
•
cij
tij e−20
1 1 1
1
1 3
2
Fig. 4 Bids on bundles of operations.
– we attach the valuation pij of bid Bidij to the corresponding bid transition tij .
In the example, we associate the bid value pij=−e 20 to transition tij . Hence,
whenever tij fires, the cost/value pij is added to the value of the firing sequence.
It is easy to check that the weighted net in Figure 4 allows to fire any subset
of {tij1, tij2, tij3} (depending on the tokens) with the corresponding multiplicities
(1, 3, 2). Notice also that firing at least one of the three transitions requires to pre-
viously fire transition tij , because this guarantees having the required tokens in the
input places cijk. In this way, we guarantee that firing at least one of the transitions
implies firing also tij , and therefore that the corresponding money is added to the
overall cost/value.
Any legal firing sequence on the weighted net in Figure 4 guarantees that selecting
at least one of the tijk implies also selecting tij . However, we need a further require-
ment: either none of the tijk fires, or all of them fire. If they all fire, they have to fire
as many times as expressed by their multiplicities in the bids. In the figure, we have
to enforce that if tij fires, then tij1 fires once (Dij(tij1) = 1), tij2 fires three times
(Dij(tij2) = 3), and tij3 fires twice (Dij(tij3) = 2).
The weighted net in Figure 4 cannot guarantee such property by itself. For instance,
a firing sequence in which only transitions tij1 and tij2 fire (not tij3) is legal but
does not comply with our all-or-nothing assumption. In order to enforce it, we simply
impose some constraints on the final configuration of the net. Say that we impose that
in the final configuration cij1, cij2, and cij3 contain no tokens. More formally, the final
marking should fulfil the constraints:
Md(cij1) = 0 (29)
Md(cij2) = 0 (30)
Md(cij3) = 0 (31)
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This implies that all the legal firing sequences leading to the final configuration Md
contain either none or the three transitions tij1, tij2, tij3 with multiplicities 1, 2, and
3 respectively.
Therefore, the semantics regarding the multiplicity of the operations offered in bid
Bidij is completely captured by the weighted net provided. Furthermore, the weights
of the arcs connecting each bid transitions tij with its operation places cijk, along with
the constraints on the final marking, enforce that either none of the operations in Dij
is used, or all of them are used as many times as indicated by their multiplicities in
Dij .
The following proposition formalises how a weighted net structure as constructed
above can capture the semantics of an atomic bid.
Proposition 2 Let Bidij be an atomic bid with value pij and its corresponding weighted
structure (P, T, A, E, V ) with initial marking M0(cij) = 1, and M0(cijk) = 0 for all
operation places. If any final marking Md is required to fulfil that Md(cijk) = 0 for
all operation places, then any legal firing sequence fires either all or none of the atomic
operations in the bid, being pij the value of the firing sequence in the first case and 0
otherwise.
Proof Since M0(cij) = 1, bid transition tij is enabled and thus can be fired. We
distinguish two cases at this point. On the one hand, if tij does not fire, none of the
atomic operations can fire, the constraints on the final marking hold and the value of
not firing tij is 0. On the other hand, if tij fires, then each operation place cijk receives
Dij(tijk) tokens from transition tij . Since each transition tijk requires a single token
to be enabled, all atomic transitions are enabled. Since we have imposed that the final
marking Md leaves no tokens at the operation places, namely Md(cijk) = 0 ∀cijk,
all atomic transitions must fire. Therefore, both the bid transition tij along with all
atomic transitions tijk compose the firing sequence. Since firing atomic transitions has
no cost, the value of the firing sequence is V (tij) = pij , which is the value of bid
Bidij . ⊓⊔
5.2.2 Expressing XOR of atomic bids
We have learnt how to represent an atomic bid on a weighted net. However, we still
have to encode the XOR relationships among the atomic bids that come from each
bidder to fully represent our bidding language. Consider the following bid:
bid(1′tij1 + 3
′
tij2 + 2
′
tij3,−20)
XOR
bid(1′tij′1 + 1
′
tij′2,−10)
where tij1 = (2
′p1, 1
′p2 + 2
′p3), tij2 = (1
′p4, 1
′p6 + 1
′p7), tij3 = (1
′p5, 1
′p8 + 1
′p9),
tij′1 = (3
′p5, 2
′p8 + 2
′p9), and tij′2 = ({ }, 2
′p4 + 2
′p5).
Hereafter we refer to the two bids above submitted by some bidder i in XOR as to
Bidij and Bidij′ . Figure 5 depicts bids Bidij and Bidij′ .
In order to incorporate the semantics of the XOR operator into a weighted net,
we introduce a new place, labelled with pXORi , called an XOR place. Notice that an
XOR place replaces bid places. In particular, in figure 5 it replaces bid places cij and
cij′ corresponding to bids Bidij and Bidij′ . An XOR place has no input arcs and is
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Fig. 5 XOR of atomic bids.
enforced to contain a single token by the initial marking. Hence, the resulting weighted
net topology enforces that at most one of the atomic bids in XOR is selected. In figure 5
either tij or tij′ can fire, but not both. When either of them fires, it consumes the
unique token in pXORi , thus preventing the firing of the other one. This corresponds
to selecting at most one bid out of bids Bidij and Bidij′ . This reasoning naturally
applies to the general case of m bids in XOR. Moreover, say that, for instance, we
choose to fire tij . Then all atomic operations in the bid (namely tij1, tij2, tij3) must
fire as stated by proposition 2. In other words, an XOR place acts as an exclusive bid
place for all the atomic bids involved in an XOR bid.
5.3 Connecting the mixed auction WDP and MAXSEQ: the Mixed Auction Net
In this section we formalize what was explained informally in the previous section: how
to build a weighted net that encodes all the bids received by an auctioneer. We shall
call such weighted net the Mixed Auction Net.
Definition 13 Given a finite set of bids B in the XOR bidding language and a multiset
Uin over a set of goods G, its Mixed Auction Net is the weighted net computed by
function ConstructMixedAuctionNet(B,Uin) in Algorithm 1. ⊓⊔
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Algorithm 1 details how to build a mixed auction net from some set B of XOR bids.
Line 1 creates a place for each good at auction and initialises the remaining variables to
empty sets. We call PG the set that contains the places that represent goods. Lines 2-4
establish that the initial marking for places that represent goods is set according to the
number of units that Uin specifies for each good. Line 7 adds a new place (p
XOR
i ) for
each XOR bid and adds a single token (unit) to the initial marking (so that each XOR
bid can be only selected once). The PXOR set contains all XOR places. Line 10 adds a
new transition (tij) for each atomic bid and sets its value to pij (the value specified by
the bid), whereas line 11 links each newly created transition with the place representing
its XOR bid. Line 13 adds a control place cijk to control each operation and line 14
links it as an output to the transition representing its combinatorial bid (tij), setting
the number of tokens to output to the cardinality of operation tijk in the combinatorial
bid (namely to Dij(tijk)). The PC set contains all the control places. Line 16 adds a
new transition tijk (with value zero) for each atomic bid, which line 17 links to its
control place cijk so that each time tijk fires, it consumes a token from cijk. We call
the set of all transitions representing operations TOP . Finally, lines 18-20 and 21-23
link each transition tijk representing an operation with its input and output goods
respectively.
The introduction of the mixed auction net allows us to define the mixed auction
WDP as a MAXSEQ problem.
Theorem 4 Given a mixed auction with a multiset of available goods Uin, a multiset
of required goods Uout, and a set of bids B in the XOR language over the goods in
G, solving the WDP amounts to solving the MAXSEQ problem defined on the Mixed
Algorithm 1 ConstructMixedAuctionNet(B,Uin)
1: P ← {pg | g ∈ G}; T ← ∅; A ← ∅; M0 ← ∅;
2: for g in G do
3: M0 ←M0 + {Uin(pg) copies of pg}; /* Establish initial marking for goods */
4: end for
5: for Bidi in B do
6: /* Add a place for each XOR bid and set its initial marking to contain one token */
7: P ← P ∪ {pXORi }; M0 ←M0 + {p
XOR
i };
8: for Bidij in Bidi do
9: /* Add a new transition for each atomic bid, set its value to the bid’s value */
10: T ← T ∪ {tij}; V (tij) = pij ;
11: A ← A ∪ {(pXORi , tij)}; E(p
XOR
i , tij) = 1; /* and link it to its XOR bid */
12: for Bidijk in Bidij do
13: P ← P ∪ {cijk}; /* Add a new place for each operation */
14: A ← A ∪ {(tij , cijk)}; E(tij , cijk) = Dij(tijk); /* and link it to its combin. bid */
15: /* Add a new transition for each operation, set its value to zero */
16: T ← T ∪ {tijk}; V (tij) = 0;
17: A ← A∪{(cijk, tijk)}; E(cijk, tijk) = 1; /* link it to its control place, */
18: for g in Iijk do
19: A ← A ∪ {(pg , tijk)}; E(pg, tijk) = Iijk(pg); /* link it to its inputs */
20: end for
21: for g in Oijk do
22: A ← A∪{(tijk, pg)}; E(tijk, pg) = Oijk(pg); /* and link it to its outputs */
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: end for
27: return (P, T, A, E,M0, V );
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Auction Net S = (P, T, A, E,M0, V ) with destination marking Md that fulfils the
following constraints
Md(p) ≥ Uout(g) p ∈ PG (32)
Md(p) = 0 p ∈ PC (33)
Md(p) ≥ 0 p ∈ PXOR (34)
Proof The proof is long and needs a bit more notation than introduced in this paper.
We only report about the way the two solutions can be mapped to each other. For the
complete proof the reader can consult [25].
⇒) First, we prove that a solution to MAXSEQ can be transformed into a solution to
the WDP. Note that each solution to MAXSEQ is a sequence of transitions, some of
them representing atomic bids and some others representing operations. A solution to
the mixed auction WDP is composed by two sets of binary variables xmijk (that takes
on 1 if tijk is at position m in the solution sequence) and xij (that takes on 1 if bid
Bidij is accepted). We construct the mixed auction WDP solution by removing from
the MAXSEQ solution all the transitions that represent atomic bids. In the resulting
sequence, transitions only represent operations. Hence, we can set to 1 those variables
xmijk such that operation tijk appears at position m. Regarding the transitions in the
MAXSEQ solution that represent atomic bids, we can set xij to 1 if tij appears in
the MAXSEQ solution. It is then straightforward (although tedious and beyond the
scope of this paper) to show that this assignment of values to xmijk and xij fulfils the
conditions in equations (1)-(6) corresponding to the Direct Integer Program that solves
the MMUCA WDP.
⇐) We prove the converse as well. Given a solution {xmijk,xij} to the mixed auction
WDP, it can be transformed into a solution to the MAXSEQ problem posed in the
theorem. In this case we construct a sequence of transitions by placing a transition tij
(representing an atomic bid) in the sequence for each bid Bidij such that xij is 1. We
can place these transitions at any order at the beginning of the sequence. We complete
the remainder of the sequence with transitions that represent operations following the
order specified by xmijk. More precisely, if k atomic bids are selected for the solution
(k variables xij taking on 1), then for every variable x
m
ijk with value 1 we can place
the transition representing operation tijk at position k + m of the transition sequence.
It is also tedious but simple to show that such sequence fulfils the conditions to be a
solution to the MAXSEQ problem. ⊓⊔
Notice that it is straightforward to generalise the previous result for the OR lan-
guage by incorporating appropriate changes to the weighted net. Thus, we should only
represent all the bids as in Figure 4, omitting the XOR places.
Now we can start benefitting from Theorem 4 by providing (under acyclicity) a
better mapping of the mixed auction WDP to ILP than the one provided in Section
3.3.
Corollary 2 Whenever a mixed auction net is acyclic, the mixed auction WDP can
be reduced to ILP using |B|+ |T | variables, where |B| stands for the number of atomic
bids received and |T | stands for the number of different operations appearing in the
bids.
Proof Follows directly from the fact that the mixed auction WDP can be reduced to
MAXSEQ and that whenever the weighted net is acyclic MAXSEQ can be reduced to
ILP using as many variables as transitions. ⊓⊔
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Recall that the number of variables needed for the mapping in Section 3.3 is O(δ ·
|T |), i.e. it is quadratic in |T |, and possibly even significantly larger than that, namely
when transformations appear with high multiplicity. The acyclicity constraint excludes
some interesting cases such as those where a good is borrowed and returned after the
execution of the operation. However, it covers some common topologies such as the
assembly of a good from its components or its dissasembly into its parts (though not
both simultaneously).
Our aim in this section is showing that, from the firing sequence associated with
a particular MAXSEQ problem on the Mixed Auction Net, we can derive an optimal
solution sequence to the corresponding mixed auction WDP.
5.4 Advantages of the mapping to MAXSEQ
It is time to highlight the advantages brought about by mapping the mixed auction
WDP to the MAXSEQ problem over weighted nets. In particular, the mapping allows
to import all the Petri net tools and properties presented in the literature to analyze
structural and behavioral properties of the supply chain resulting from a mixed auction.
Some examples of application are listed below:
1. One can very efficiently solve the underlying ILP when the supply chain is acyclic.
This benefit comes from exploiting an important nets analysis tool, the state equa-
tion.
2. One may be interested in maintaining under a certain threshold the level of re-
sources present in each place (for instance, because of inventory capacity con-
straints). In order to guarantee that resources do not exceed some threshold(s)
amounts to investigating the so-called boundedness property [7], a well-known be-
havioural property of nets.
3. Due to the very appealing and intuitive weighted net graphical representation, we
can compactly encode and visualize the search space associated with the mixed
auction WDP. This stems from the the fact that the semantics of transitions on
nets naturally accommodates the representation of operations.
4. Once a solution sequence to the mixed auction WDP is obtained, one can visualize
it by means of a token game showing the evolution of the supply chain at any step
of the operation sequence.
5. One can graphically visualize the mixed auction WDP problem. This provides
a very helpful guidance to obtaine insights about the problem. For instance, by
visualizing the mixed auction WDP by means of a weighted net, one can incorporate
new bidding language constructs with a minimum effort. For instance, consider the
following example.
Example 2 We explained that switching to the OR language instead of the XOR
bidding language is as simple as removing the XOR place from Figure 5, as shown
in Figure 4. However, there is another widely employed bidding language that is
very compact and human-readable. Is is called the XOR-of-OR bidding language
(refer to Section 3.1). When employing a XOR-of-OR bidding language, any XOR
combination of OR combinations of atomic bids can be selected. For instance, the
following bid:
((a, 1) OR (a, 1) OR (a, 1) OR (a, 1) OR (a, 1)) XOR (b, 2) (35)
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means that an auctioneer can select from 0 to 5 copies of atomic bid (a, 1) or one
copy of atomic bid (b, 2), but not both things at the same time. In Figure 6, we
graphically show how to incorporate the XOR-of-OR bidding language by depicting
the following bid:
(bid(1′tij1 + 3
′
tij2 + 2
′
tij3,−20) OR (36)
bid(1′tij′1 + 1
′
tij′2,−10)) XOR (37)
bid(1′tij′′1,−2) (38)
tij1 tij2 tij3
tij′1
tij′2
= 0
cij1
= 0
cij2
= 0
cij3
= 0
cij′1
= 0
cij′2
tije−20 tij′e−10
1 1 1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
•
pXORi
≥ 0
≥ 0 ≥ 0
tOR
ij′
tij′′1
= 0
cij′′1 tij′′
e−2
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
Fig. 6 XOR-of-OR of atomic bids
The single token in place pXORi allows either to fire transition tij′′ or (exclusively)
transition tORij′ . If transition tij′′ fires, then the auctioneer would be using the bid
bid(1′tij′′1,−2). Otherwise, the firing of transition t
OR
ij′ would place exactly one
token in each one of its output places. That would enable both transitions tij
and tij′ , and therefore the auctioneer could select firing either: (i) tij (namely
accepting bid(1′tij1 +3
′tij2 +2
′tij3,−20)); (ii) tij′ (namely accepting bid(1
′tij′1 +
1′tij′2,−10))); (iii) both. All these combinations would fulfil the final constraints
represented by the inequalities at the output places of transition tORij′ . ⊓⊔
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6 Conclusions and future work
Mixed auctions can potentially be employed for the automated assembly of supply
chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to SCF,
we must ensure computational feasibility while preserving optimality. In this paper we
have tried to make headway along this direction.
Firstly we discussed the notions of bidding language and winner determination for
mixed auctions following [4]. Integer programming allows to solve the mixed auction
WDP on any supply chain network topology. However, it has the disadvantage to be
computationally expensive. In fact, such a an ILP formulation requires a number of
decision variables that grows quadratically with the number of operations mentioned in
the bids. This computational cost motivates the need for efficient solvers that support
the practical application of mixed auctions.
Contributions on computationally efficient WDP solvers for different auction types
(namely, [22] for CAs and [29] for multi-attribute double auctions) agree on and defend
that a careful, formal analysis of the structure of the WDP can provide guidance for
developing efficient solvers. Along this line we have introduced a graphical formalism
that allows to compactly represent both the search space and the solutions associated
with the mixed auction WDP. To attain this goal we have extended Place Transition
Nets to provide the so-called weighted nets, we have defined a new optimisation problem
over weighted nets, the so-called Constrained Maximum Weight Occurrence Sequence
Problem (MAXSEQ), and we have mapped the mixed auction WDP to a MAXSEQ.
Notice that the validity of the mapping from the mixed auction WDP to weighted nets
is not restricted to bids in the XOR language, but in fact it can easily cope with other
languages. For instance, as discussed in Section 5.4, the extension to the OR and the
OR-of-XOR language is trivial.
A major benefit of our graphical formalism is that it allows to formally analyse the
structural and behavioural properties of the mixed auction WDP. In this work, as a
first result of our structural analysis, we demonstrate how to dramatically reduce the
number of decision variables (from quadratic to linear with respect to the number of
operations) for a broad class of mixed auctions WDPs (in particular, when the weighted
nets underlying the mixed auction WDP is acyclic).
Notice that although our approach is limited to a class of mixed auction WDPs,
we know from the literature that it is possible to increase the classes of Petri nets for
which the state equation represents the whole reachability set. As an example, one
may add linear side constraints to the state equation [30]. In general, we would like
to broaden the class of mixed auction WDPs we can efficiently solve. Thus, our future
aim will be to devise the most efficient solver for each class of mixed auction WDP.
This work opens several paths to future research. The most interesting extension
we envisage to mixed auctions concerns the incorporation of time and uncertainty. On
the one hand, there is the need to express the release time and duration of operations,
as well as their inclusion in the WDP. Hence, an auctioneer would be able to fix
deadlines to have his production process completed. Moreover, the participants in the
supply chain would be able to synchronise their operations by fulfilling not only the
producer/consumer relationships, but also time constraints. On the other hand, an
auctioneer might be interested in assigning a probability of success to each operation
to obtain more robust supply chains that prevent failures and shortcomings. In both
cases, we would require to extend our current model of weighted net along with the
mapping to the mixed auction WDP.
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